Falklands War American Dithering

US wanted to warn Argentina about South Georgia - Telegraph

The proposal, by US secretary of state Alexander Haig, was intended to show the military junta in Buenos Aires that America was a neutral player and could be trusted to act impartially during negotiations to end the conflict.

However, the British ambassador in Washington was so appalled that he demanded a categorical assurance it would not happen and warned that any advance notice could lead to devastating submarine or air attacks.

The heated exchanges are detailed in previously secret files released by the National Archives, which show how strained the special relationship became during the British campaign in the Falkland Islands.

^{A sketch released by the National Archives explaining the Argentinian invasion on April 3, 1982 on South Georgia}

Ronald Reagan, the then US President, made repeated last-ditch attempts to persuade Margaret Thatcher to negotiate a truce so the Argentinians could save face and avoid "complete humiliation".

He feared that support for a European colonial power would undermine ties with Latin America and hamper Washington’s covert campaign against communism in the western hemisphere.

Thatcher refused, telling Mr Reagan in a late night phone call on May 31st, 1982 that she would "not contemplate" a ceasefire after the loss of "precious British lives".

She also rejected demands to hand the Falklands over to a joint US-Brazilian peacekeeping force, saying that she had not sent British forces across the globe just to "hand over the Queen's islands to a contact group".

Separately, Mrs Thatcher found herself subject to demands from the Pope John Paul II. In one telegram, he calls on God to help "secure an immediate ceasefire. Thatcher, however, stood her ground, replying that Argentine aggression "cannot be allowed to succeed".

The British government also warned the Holy Father that if he cancelled a visit during the Falklands it would be "interpreted by the British public and others as a pro-Argentine gesture"

While US defense secretary Caspar Weinberger proved a staunch ally of Britain from the outbreak of war on 2 April 1982, authorising secret shipments of weapons vital to the task force, the US state department was anything but sympathetic to British interests.

^{The Royal Marine detachment at Grytviken, South Georgia (National Archives)}

During a meeting on April 21, as SAS troops were already landing on South Georgia to reconnoitre Argentinian positions, Haig explained his thinking to Sir Nicholas Henderson, Britain’s ambassador to the United States.

“Haig said that he had been giving further thought to our proposed operation, an event that he was sure would alter the whole scene,” wrote Henderson in a cable to London. “His immediate concern was the problem that it would cause for the US in their dealings with Argentina.

"The latter would regard it as an act of collusion between Washington and London. The Argentinians would know that they, the Americans, must have had prior knowledge of the intended invasion. Haig told me that in fact they had collateral intelligence now of the presence of the task force off South Georgia.

"The Argentinians would be deeply suspicious if the Americans had done nothing, having received information of British military intentions. He therefore thought that he would have to give the Argentinian junta advance notice of our intended operation.

"He would say that they knew about this from their own intelligence sources. He would only notify them at a sufficiently late time so that this would involve no military threat to us.

"If the Americans acted in this way they would be able to show even-handedness to the Argentinians and this would enable them to continue their role as go-between.”

In fact, any warning could have been disastrous. Neither the British nor the Americans were aware of the presence of the Argentinian submarine Santa Fe in the area, and the junta had also planned a long-range attack on an invading force using Canberra bombers.

South Georgia, a mountainous wasteland of rock and ice, was defended by 140 troops who would have benefitted from even a few hours’ notice of an attack. Henderson was flabbergasted.

“I expressed strong objection to what Haig had told me,” he wrote. “It would be taken extremely adversely in London as going much further than the requirements of negotiating neutrally required. To hand on to the Argentinians US intelligence about British movements and intentions at an extremely delicate moment was to help them and was not simply to be neutral.

“The Argentinians might well turn such prior intelligence to their own use against our invasion force. They would certainly give the marines and other Argentinians present in South Georgia advance warning. They might well give their submarines instructions to attack our ships. They could mount a suicide air attack upon our naval forces.”

In what must at times have been a heated exchange, Haig and his deputy, Lawrence Eagleburger, backed down, saying it “would not do” at if prior warning led to “military difficulties” for the British.

But they wanted to know how the US could preserve its status as a neutral negotiator.

“I said that I must insist beyond shadow of doubt that they would not give prior notice to the Argentinians,” wrote Henderson. “Haig gave me an absolute assurance on that point.”

^{The moment of South Georgia's surrender by the Argentinian forces as their commander Capt. Alfredo Astiz signs the official document (National Archives)}

Pym, who had replaced Lord Carrington as Foreign Secretary following the latter’s resignation over the seizure of the Falklands, was equally appalled.

“I am grateful to you for having averted what could have been a very dangerous development,” he wrote to Henderson. “I find it amazing that it should have crossed the Americans’ mind that they ought to tell the Argentinians about our impending move.”

In a sign that he did not trust the Americans, Pym told Henderson to be deliberately vague about the timing of the South Georgia operation, citing the uncertain weather.

On May 25, four days after the British landing at San Carlos, Haig was asserting US interests again.

“We are fast approaching the point at which the UK will have a decisive local military advantage, with success clearly within your reach,” he told Pym. “At that point, the Argentines could feel compelled to turn to the Cubans and Soviets as their last hope to avert total humiliation. Should Galtieri resist these pressures, he could be swept aside and replaced by those far more hostile to fundamental western interests.

Even if the Argentines do not open themselves to the Soviets and Cubans, they are virtually certain to want to continue a state of war.”

That, he warned, would result in an open-ended conflict and international isolation for the UK and US. The solution was for British forces to withdraw once Port Stanley had fallen. “

The US would be prepared to provide a battalion-sized force for the purpose of ensuring that there would no violation of any interim agreement preceding a final settlement,” he continued.

“Because of what has happened to our standing with the Argentines as a result of our support for you, there is no chance a US-only force would be acceptable. We would therefore need to persuade the most trustworthy major hemispheric power – Brazil – to join us. A combined force would represent a credible deterrent and assure the security of the islanders for the period of an interim agreement.”

Too much blood had been spilled for Margaret Thatcher even to consider such a proposal. The British weren’t going anywhere.

The Eldredge Necktie Knot

Eldredge Tie Knot - How to Tie a Eldredge Necktie Knot
Cool design to try out next time.

Recalling The Gulf War And Schwarzkopf

1991 Victory Over Iraq Was Swift, but Hardly Flawless

As the 1991 Persian Gulf war drew to a close, Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf told an anxious nation that an American-led juggernaut had swept across the desert, stunned its foe and evicted Saddam Hussein’s forces from Kuwait. “We’ve accomplished our mission, the gate is closed” the commander declared in a presentation deemed such a tour de force that it was known as “the mother of all briefings.

Now, General Schwarzkopf’s death, and the hospitalization of former President George Bush, 88, have returned the spotlight to the war they prosecuted together, which some of its architects have cast as a model for a successful intervention abroad. The gulf war appeared to have it all: a foreign tyrant who committed an indisputable act of aggression, a president who rallied the international community to roll back the occupation of a defenseless oil-rich nation, and an American military eager to prove itself in its most demanding test since Vietnam.

For some former officials it was, plain and simple, the “good war” — a war that set limited objectives against an invader, was waged in a mere six weeks and was then punctuated by victory parades. The battles yet to come, more open-ended conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, proved to be far more costly in lives and treasure. And yet the Persian Gulf War occupies a more complex place in military history than the hagiography suggests. The generalship was not without its faults, and the White House decision to bring the conflict to a close before all of Mr. Hussein’s Republican Guard divisions were destroyed has remained a subject of debate, even among ranking officers who were on the battlefield.

The 1991 gulf conflict may have been a “war of necessity,” as its supporters say, and the 2003 invasion of Iraq a “war of choice.” But it was the outcome of the first gulf war, which left Mr. Hussein in power and forced the United States to carry out more than a decade of air patrols over northern and southern Iraq, that presented the United States with that choice.

The act that precipitated the gulf conflict was Mr. Hussein’s August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, an attack that caught the White House flat-footed despite intelligence warning of the Iraqis’ military preparations.

The first task was the defense of Saudi Arabia, which General Schwarzkopf’s command took on from a position of considerable disadvantage. His Central Command, based in Tampa, Fla., had no forces to speak of in the region, or even a regional headquarters. As the months went by, the planning shifted to offense as Mr. Bush and his team set their sights on evicting Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Mr. Bush and Secretary of State James A. Baker III secured the backing of the United Nations Security Council and garnered broad international support. Britain, France, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and even Syria were part of the fighting coalition.

Maintaining support at home was more challenging. The Senate resolution authorizing the use of force was adopted by a narrow vote of 52 to 47. (Senators Al Gore of Tennessee, Joseph I. Lieberman of Connecticut and Harry Reid of Nevada were among the Democrats who voted for the measure, but Senators John Kerry of Massachusetts and Joseph R. Biden Jr. of Delaware voted “no,” as did Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia.)

Iraq had a formidable arsenal of chemical weapons. Yielding to American warnings, the Iraqis did not employ poison gas. But nobody on the American side could be sure it would not be used. Guided by Gen. Colin L. Powell, who was the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the United States assembled an overwhelming force. The four-day ground war was preceded by more than five weeks of bombardment. When the shooting ended, it was clear that the all-volunteer military had been a success. Stealth aircraft and precision weapons had proved themselves on the battlefield. Though the United States deployed about 540,000 personnel, 148 were killed in action or died of their wounds, according to the Defense Department.

Importantly, the ghosts of Vietnam had been exorcised. For the first time since that bloody war in Southeast Asia, the United States armed forces demonstrated that they could win a major land war in a foreign land.

Still, the gulf war was not as decisive as some of its proponents had hoped. Trying to secure their hold on Kuwait, Iraqi commanders had erected a defense in depth. The most expendable Iraqi forces were arrayed in southern Kuwait behind mine belts, sand berms and oil-filled ditches that were set aflame. Iraq’s armored and mechanized forces were arrayed in the interior of Kuwait, along with considerable artillery. Behind them were Republican Guard divisions, the best-equipped and most loyal units in Mr. Hussein’s army. Iraq’s plan was to bloody the American forces as they pushed north into Kuwait so that the Republican Guard troops could deliver decisive blows.

General Schwarzkopf sought to turn the Iraqi strategy on its head. The plan was for the Marines, fortified by an American armored brigade, to attack into Kuwait and draw the attention of Iraqi commanders. A Marine amphibious force afloat would also be used as a feint to tie down Iraqi troops.   Then the Army’s VII Corps, which was deployed to the west of the Marines in Saudi Arabia and reinforced by a British division, would outflank the Republican Guard forces. The Army’s XVIII Airborne Corps, which was deployed in the far western desert in Saudi Arabia and reinforced by the French, would also participate in the envelopment, which became known as “the left hook.”

The goal was not merely to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait but also to destroy the Republican Guard units in order to deprive Iraq of the ability to menace Kuwait and other gulf states in the future. But the American strategy did not entirely work as planned. Instead of being lured into a kill zone, many of the Republican Guard troops began to flee. General Schwarzkopf found it difficult to accelerate the main Army attack, and the war tuned into a race.

The Army’s 24th Mechanized Infantry Division and 101st Airborne Division were beginning to catch up and hoped to bottle up the fleeing Republican Guard forces near Basra, in southern Iraq. At a 2011 conference at Texas A&M University, Walter E. Boomer, the retired general who led the Marine attack into Kuwait, recalled that he had told General Schwarzkopf over the radio that his Marines were also prepared to pursue the fleeing Iraqi forces. “I said, ‘We’re poised to launch for Basra, and we will police up the rest of these folks if you want us to,’ ” General Boomer said. “He said, ‘Stand by.’ And then the next message that I received was not directly from him but through my headquarters that we had in fact stopped.”

With American warplanes attacking Iraqi columns fleeing Kuwait City, Mr. Bush was eager to avoid the charge of piling on. He decided to end the ground war at 100 hours, with the strong encouragement of General Powell. General Schwarzkopf supported the decision, though it later emerged that amid the confusion on the battlefield not even he knew the precise location of some of the attacking American units. “On balance, we had accomplished the mission,” General Powell said at the conference. “The Iraqi Army was fleeing. And it is easy to say, ‘Well, you should have just kept killing.’ But this is an army that we did not want to totally destroy.”

But General Boomer offered a different perspective in a 2011 interview with a North Carolina radio station. “I continue to be asked if we stopped too soon,” he said. “The answer in retrospect is ‘yes.’ ” According to American intelligence, half of the Republican Guard tanks escaped as of March 1, 1991. Significantly, headquarters units also survived, and this helped Iraqi generals reconstitute their forces and put down the Shiite uprising that began in the south afterward.

At cease-fire talks that were held in Safwan, Iraq, General Schwarzkopf agreed to an Iraqi request that the Iraqi military be allowed to fly helicopters in southern Iraq because so many bridges had been destroyed. But the Iraqi military abused this concession by using the helicopters to attack the Shiite insurgents. The United States, along with its British and French allies, did not establish a no-fly zone in southern Iraq until August 1992.

Ousting Mr. Hussein would have gone beyond the formal mandate for the military campaign, and Mr. Bush and his aides were determined not to march on Baghdad and take on the burden of occupation, a decision supported by Dick Cheney, who was Mr. Bush’s secretary of defense. But declassified memorandums from Mr. Bush’s presidential archives made clear that he had hoped the war would facilitate the dictator’s exit.

In a discussion with Mr. Bush on Nov. 19, 1991, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi ambassador to Washington, delivered a message from King Fahd, the Saudi monarch. “We have a lot to do to finish with Iraq,” Prince Bandar said.

“Tell him not to worry,” Mr. Bush replied. “We must do whatever it takes to get rid of the guy. Tell him we are not changing one bit. We are talking about ways of undermining him. There will be no letting up on sanctions or inspections. We are looking into what we can do with broadcasts. We will not go back to the status quo ante.”

By MICHAEL R. GORDON. Published: December 31, 2012 in The New York Times

Brewster Buffalo found

10 Feet Below Waters Off Midway Atoll, a Famous Flying Dud - NYTimes.com
What a coincidence! Just now while making the Airfix model, the discovery of the remnants of a Buffalo in Midway Lagoon was announced. This aircraft crashed on landing and was lost in time until the incidental discovery by divers cleaning up what is now a massive marine park.

Obituaries 2012

The Lives They Lived - NYTimes.com
A collection of obituaries and remarkable stories behind their owners. Morbid, yes, but then inspiring at the same time. Well worth a read, if you have the time. The one about Najiba seems most poignant to me.

And we put our safety in their hands?

F.A.A. Rules Make Electronic Devices on Planes Hazardous - NYTimes.com
Switching off electronic devices in the planes is a routine we all go through without any basis. The same scenario exists in hospitals with a multitude of reasons, none of which can hold up to scientific reasoning. There has never been an untoward incident attributed to such use or abuse, and no hard evidence can be presented in its favour. Yet we follow blindly when given instructions by people who should know better and trustingly put our safety in their hands. Boy, are these people dumb!